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Abstract: this paper discusses the main points of the reform of the Economic and Monetary Union presented by the 
European Commission in December 2017. In particular, the author tries to evaluate the core of the proposal introduced 
by the Commission, composed by three main measures: the bringing back of the TSCG in the Treaty framework, the 
transformation of the ESM into a European Monetary Fund and the proposed introduction of an European Minister for 
Economy and Finance. All together, these acts attempt to bring back an essential part of the economic and monetary union 
in the constitutional framework of the Treaties. Will they succeed? 
 
 
1. Introduction: The reform of the Economic and Monetary Union in the 
(aftermath of the) economic and financial crisis 
The reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been object of literature since the 
rise of the economic crisis, (see in general: Bin, Caretti and Pitruzzella, 2015; Chalmers, Jachtenfuchs 
and Joerges (eds.) 2016; Daniele, Simone and Cisotta (eds.), 2017; Dawson, Enderlein and Joerges 
(eds.), 2015; Fabbrini, 2016; Hinarejos, 2015; Tuori and Tuori,  2014), nearly four decades after the 
first plans (Werner Report, 1970) and two decades after its establishment with the Maastricht Treaty 
(now Art. 3.4 and Art. 119 TFEU). The main critique forwarded against its structure has been the 
necessity to complete the integration between its two fundamental elements, the monetary policy and 
the economic policy (Snell, 2016 161). The EU has exclusive competence on monetary policy (Art. 
127 TFEU) but can only coordinate the economic policies (Art. 120 TFEU) of the Member States 
(contra see Scharpf, 2011; Id., 2010). The question we would like to answer in this article is if the 
reform of the EMU brought forward by the European Commission on 6 December 2017 can claim to 
be an amenable solution, or at least an important step further in the integration of economic and 
monetary policies (European Commission, 2017). The proposals brought forward by the Commission 
is composed of a number of different acts: 1) a Communication on the future of the EMU 
(COM(2017) 821), 2) a proposal for a Council Directive for strengthening fiscal responsibility 
(ultimately addressed into re-embody the Treaty on Stability, Governance and Coordination (TSGC) 
into the Treaty Framework)(COM(2017) 824), 3) a Communication on the European Minister of 
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Economy and Finance (COM(2017) 823), 4) a proposal for a Council Regulation to transform the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into an European Monetary Fund (EMF) (COM(2017) 827), 
5) a proposal of amendment to Regulation n. 1303/2013 (Common Provisions Regulation) to increase 
the rate of efficiency in the repartition of funding instruments (COM(2017) 826), 6) a proposal for 
amendments to strengthen the Structural Support Programme (COM(2017) 825) and 7) a 
Communication on budgetary instruments for a stable Euro area (COM(2017) 822). In this paper we 
will focus on the noyau dur of the reform: after an overview of the Communication on the future of 
the EMU we will attempt to measure the importance and the impact of the proposals concerning the 
re-embodiment of the TSCG in the Treaties, of the Communication on the Minister for Economy and 
Finance and of the transformation of the European Stability Mechanism into the European Monetary 
Fund. The analysis of the initiatives of the Commission will lead us in understanding if the proposals 
represent a step further towards i) the rebalancing of the asymmetry of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, completing the integration between its two parts and ii) the challenging of the democracy 
deficit (see recently Adamski, 2018) that has, over the years, affected the solutions proposed to solve 
the economic crisis. As an ultimate consequence, we will try to understand if this reform package 
might represent a step further in the full integration of economic governance, as the macro-economic 
part of the EU’s economic constitution, in the EU constitutional legal order (Rossi 2018, 405). 
 
2. The Communication on the future of the Economic and Monetary Union 
The first item on the Commission reform agenda is the Communication on the Future of the EMU. 
Although the purpose of the Communication is to introduce the content of the initiatives of the 
Commission, there are at least two important elements of the package proposal that we can draw from 
its reading: first, the rationale of the reform attempt and, second, the Commission’s projection about 
the timeline of the adoption of the proposals. According to the Commission, the three “inspiring 
principles” that reflect the rationale of the reform of the EMU are i) unity, ii) efficiency and iii) 
democratic accountability (Starita 2017, 3). Unity refers to the fact that, according to the Commission, 
all the non-euro Member States (with the exception of the United Kingdom and Denmark) are 
ultimately compelled to join the common currency. Although this legal obligation cannot be rebutted, 
it is known that some of the non-euro Member States are likely to postpone the deadline for joining 
the common currency. This is the case of Romania, meant to join the Eurozone in 2019, that has not 
yet clarified its intention to join. The second inspiring principle of the proposal is represented by the 
efficiency of the system. In this case, efficiency refers to the need to bring intergovernmental 
instruments created during the crisis, as the European Stability Mechanism1 and the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG),2 back into the EU legal framework. In this sense, 
the central issue is the legal basis chosen by the European Commission for the establishment of the 
European Monetary Fund and for the re-embodiment of the TSCG, as well as for the decision not to 
present a proposal on the Minister of Economic and Finance but rather to make recourse to an 
informal agreement on the model of the Eurogroup. How this will be done is a matter that will be 
treated in the next paragraphs. The last principle that characterizes the initiative of the Commission 
is the necessity to reinforce the democratic accountability of the decision making process of the EU 
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economic governance. The Commission claims that the submission of the procedure to the EU 
decision making process and the involvement of the Council and the Parliament will grant that the 
necessary powers will be conferred over the newly established bodies. This is however a debatable 
and problematic point: as mentioned above, the choice of the legal basis, which is the only one 
available under the Treaties, allows only for a limited involvement of the Parliament under different 
special legislative procedures. The Commission also proposes a timeline for the completion of the 
reform: the executive arm of the EU (see COM(2017) 822, 13) is confident that the two proposals on 
the EMF and the TSCG will be approved before the end of the legislature and proposes to appoint the 
new Minister for Economics and Finance in the context of the election of the 2019 term of the 
European Commission. Given that the European elections are getting closer and the likelihood of 
approval before the end of the legislature is diminishing over time, the destiny of this reform is 
uncertain. What is on the other side real is the concern that unveils, namely the need for a radical 
reform of the EMU. 
 
3. The proposal for the re-embodiment of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Treaties 
 
The first initiative of the Commission that we will consider in this analysis is a proposal for a 
Council directive laying down provisions for strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term 
budgetary orientation in the Member States (COM(2017) 824). The proposal attempts to bring the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (Baratta, 2012, 647, Bonvicini and F. Brugnoli (a 
cura di), 2012; Cantore and Martinico, 2013, 463; Craig, 2012, 231; Louis, 2012, 5; Rossi, 2012, 293) 
back into the picture of the Treaties, with particular reference to its mostly debated part, the Fiscal 
Compact.3 What it is not however clear at first glance is to what extent the proposal will repeal or 
rather simply complement the TSCG, and if the balanced budget rule, after having made its way 
through the national constitutions (see, in general, Adam, Fabbrini and Larouche (eds.), 2014) will 
be effectively transposed or not into EU primary legislation. The proposal seems also to state quite 
clearly that its scope is limited to the “substance” of the TSCG and namely to its Art. 3 (Croci, 2018). 
However, differently from the original text of the Treaty, in the proposal is outlined that each Member 
State should tend to respect the threshold established by Art. 126 TFEU and Protocol 12 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, but is free to choose “a framework of binding and permanent numerical fiscal rules which 
are specific to it”(Art. 3.1, COM(2017) 824). The proposal also recognises the role of the independent 
bodies created in the aftermath of the crisis in order to provide counsel and advice on public finances, 
and creates a legal obligation for the Member States to establish a link between the recommendation 
of the independent bodies and the budgetary authorities (the Parliaments) (Art. 3.4, COM(2017) 824). 
A first problem of the proposal, however, seems to be the fact that the implementation of the fiscal 
rules to be followed will be left entirely to the Member States. This is inevitably connected to the 
nature of the legal instrument chosen, a directive, which allows for the establishment of objectives to 
be attained with different means by the Member States. Although this element might be interpreted 
as an attempt to reconcile the EU institution with the public opinion (since they leave to the EU 
Member States the discretion to establish their own rules, instead of imposing a European set of rules), 
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this discretion is likely to undermine the actual enforcement of the proposal. On the other side, it must 
be acknowledged that a higher degree of involvement of national Parliaments, which will be in charge 
of establishing their own fiscal rules to comply with the EU framework, will most likely be interpreted 
as a step towards a greater democratic accountability, pursuant to the third inspiring principle of the 
EMU reform package. This approach towards a higher involvement of national legislator is also 
reflected by the overall spirit of the proposal, which seems to be focused on flexibility rather than on 
the conditionality that informed the language of the Commission in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis (see Joerges, 2018, 75; de Witte, Ott and Vos (eds.), 2017; Beukers, de Witte and Kilpatrick 
(eds.), 2017) Mc Donnell, 2014, 57). The TSCG should accordingly take into account the flexibility 
built in the Stability and Growth Package and identified by the Commission in 2015 (COM(2017) 
824, 5). Similarly to the other proposals, this initiative of the Commission adopts a legal basis, Art. 
126(14) TFEU, which requires the unanimity at the Council and the consultation of the European 
Parliament. 
 
4. A European Minister for Economy and Finance? 
 
The second item on the Commission EMU reform package is the Communication on the European 
Minister for Economy and Finance (COM(2017) 823). The European Commission, in its initiative, 
proposes the establishment of an informal Minister who, within the portfolio of the next European 
Commission, will gather all the different roles connected to the economic and monetary policy. The 
to-be-selected Minister will be, at the same time, the Chair of the Eurogroup, the Vice President of 
the Commission for Economy and Finance and will be politically responsible for the work of the 
future European Monetary Fund, chairing its Governing Board. The picture portrayed by the 
Commission reminds, accordingly, the role played within external action by the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs. The main problem is, however, that this Communication seems to 
draw inspiration from the Eurogroup model. While simultaneously – thanks to the current package of 
proposals - the TSCG and the ESM are about to be brought back into the picture of the EU legal 
order, a configuration of the Council which plays a fundamental role in the governance of the EMU, 
the Eurogroup, remains an “informal forum for discussion” (see, to this respect, the Court of Justice 
decision in Mallis, C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, 2016, paras 46-47) between the Minister of Economics 
and Finance of the Eurozone. This led, in the past, to a grey zone in between supranationalism and 
intergovernamentalism that has allowed the EU institutions to reduce, although in very specific 
circumstances, the intensity of the review of the Court of Justice (Mallis, para 61). The initiative of 
the Commission goes in the direction of providing a “single phone number” for EU economic-
governance, resounding the statement traditionally attributed to Kissinger.4 However, the essence of 
this proposal is simple and troublesome at the same time: what if, for instance, an agreement in the 
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whom he regarded as incompetent and ineffective, who was trying to represent the whole of the EU as President of the 
Council. Kissinger himself has disowned the remark, and it seems that he was actually seeking to divide and rule in 
Europe, rather than be restricted to a single voice on the telephone.” See G. Rachman, “Kissinger never wanted to dial 
Europe”, in Financial Times, 22 July 2009, available at www.ft.com. 
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Eurogroup is not reached to appoint the Vice President of the Commission as its own President? What 
if the act of the Eurogroup endorsing a decision of the European Monetary Fund is not reviewable by 
the Court of Justice? Overall, this proposal seems to contradict the commitment to democratic 
accountability and efficiency made by the Commission in the Communication on the future of the 
EMU: perhaps this represents the best solution, on the basis of the current legal framework, but this 
still does not solve the problem of the accountability of such a role (COM(2017) 824, 7). Where the 
Minister of Economics and Finance can be of help, is, however, in helping into better integrating 
economic and monetary policy and, enhancing economic policy coordination, contributing into 
rebalancing the economic and the social objectives of the EU (Costamagna 2016, 359). The figure 
proposed seems, in principle, to be able to ensure an enhanced coordination of the economic policy 
– being President of the Eurogroup – and of the monetary policy – as Vice President of the 
Commission – while and to act as a connection between the Council, the Commission and the Member 
states. However, the possibility to succeed seems to rely more on the personal reputation and 
accountability of the person appointed as Minister rather than on the actual set of powers and 
competences conferred by the mean of an act of the institutions.  
 
5. From the European Stability Mechanism to the European Monetary Fund  
 
The last piece of legislation presented by the Commission is a proposal for a Council Regulation 
on the establishment of an European Monetary Fund (COM(2017) 827). This initiative should 
transform the European Stability Mechanism into a body of the European Union which should be 
able to provide financial assistance to the EU Member States experiencing serious economic and 
financial imbalances, and this should be done using the legal basis provided for by Art. 352 TFEU, 
the open-ended power clause that allows the Commission to act when “the Treaties have not provided 
the necessary powers”.  As to the governance of the newly established body, according to the EMF 
Statute proposal (Annex, COM (2017) 827) brought forward by the Commission, the composition of 
the newly established EMF Board should be the same of the Eurogroup, and, according to the position 
expressed by the Commission in its Communication, the Minister of Economic and Finance should 
be the chair of the Board of Governors. The actual initiative of the Commission is composed of two 
parts: a Regulation establishing the EMF and the Statute of the EMF. The EMF will be founded as a 
fully fledged EU body with legal personality, adding to the current ESM mission, which is the 
provision of financial assistance to the Member States which are experiencing economic and financial 
imbalances, “the new task of providing credit lines or guarantees in support of the SRB [Single 
Resolution Board] for backstopping the SRF [Single Resolution Fund]” (COM(2017) 827, 14). The 
introduction of this backstop has the effect of providing an additional guarantee to the Banking Union, 
in sight of the approval of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (COM (2015) 856). Another 
advancement that the Commission plans to introduce is that the European Monetary Fund will be also 
allowed, under certain circumstances, to buy national bonds of the EMF Member States on the 
primary market, something that, at the present date, is not permitted even to the ECB (COM(2017) 
827, recital 49). The main concern is here connected to the obligations imposed by the Treaties. Art. 
123 TFEU prohibits to the European Central Bank the direct purchase of debt instruments of the 
Member States, but does not say anything on other EU institutions or bodies (as the future EMF) to 
be established - inter alia - with the purpose of buying national bonds on the primary market. If this 
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proposal will ever pass the unanimity barrier at the Council, it is likely that the act will be challenged 
on this ground in front of the Court of Justice, either according to the action for annulment pursuant 
to Art. 263 TFEU, or within a procedure for preliminary ruling under Art. 267 TFEU. The 
Commission, in the Communication on the Future of Europe (COM(2017) 821, 6) and in the EMF 
proposal, (COM(2017) 827, 7) acknowledges that the current set of proposals might be held 
problematic in light of the Meroni case law on the delegation of powers from the EU institutions to 
other EU bodies and agencies (case 9-56, Meroni). However, the Commission maintains that the 
endorsement of the Council to the politically sensitive decisions to be taken by the future EMF will 
be a sufficient guarantee and will ensure a correct delegation of competences (Art. 3, COM(2017) 
827). Here it is worth to discuss briefly the conditions of the involvement of the Council. The EMF 
proposal distinguished between a) decisions adopted pursuant to the EMF Statute (Art. 3.1 
COM(2017)  827) from b) “circumstances [that] require the urgent provision of stability support” 
(Art. 3.2 COM(2017) 827). In both cases, the Council is meant to approve, with different powers, the 
decisions taken by the Board of Governors or by the Board of Directors of the EMF. The question is 
then how this approval will be granted. Art. 3.4 of the proposed Regulation (COM(2017) 827) 
provides the answer: the right to vote and to adopt the EMF decisions will be restricted to the Member 
States of the Euro-zone, and they will vote according to the qualified majority procedure in Art. 236 
TFEU. Hence, the real problem is if, according to the actual framework of the Treaties, such a 
conferral of power might actually take place, since it calls into question the (already mentioned) 
Meroni doctrine. Since, as briefly shown, the disruptive potential of the present proposal is high, it is 
likely that the unanimity required by the legal basis in the Council will be reached at the price of a 
compromise on the proposal that might, or not, change the substance of the initiative of the 
Commission. Another solution might be that, after realising that the EMF proposal in its actual state 
I not viable, the Commission and the Member States will open an enhanced cooperation procedure 
(Art. 329 TFEU). This procedure, however, requires a considerable amount of time and the 
coordination between the different EU institutional actors: a minimum number of Member States 
should ask to the Commission to deliver a proposal to the Council, and the Member States 
representatives participating into the procedure should approve unanimously the initiative. How this 
will be done before the end of the Juncker legislature is an open question. 
 
6. The projected reform and the asymmetry of the Economic and Monetary Union 
 
The reform proposed by the European Commission is, in principle, highly likely to have a positive 
impact over the asymmetry of the EMU. The asymmetry of the EMU (Scharpf, 2011), the exclusive 
competence in monetary policy vis à vis  the coordination of economic policy, is one of the most 
known and most debated issues in the field of EMU scholarship, and represents one of the main 
critiques that has been brought forward by those advocating the necessity to withdraw from a project 
that is ultimately doomed to fail. In this sense the proposal of the Commission has the potential to at 
least address the issue of asymmetry between economic and monetary policy. Taking into account 
the caveat and the doubts expressed in the previous paragraphs, a task like the one of the European 
Minister of Economy and Finance, if it actually takes place, is seriously capable to coordinate 
economic policy and bring into the picture an increased democratic accountability. His role as vice 
president of the Commission and President of the Eurogroup and of the EMF might represent an 
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important opportunity for strengthening the coordination of economic policy. At the same time, the 
Commission proposal to make the decisions of the EMF accountable to the Council is a reasonable 
option, which enhance the democratic accountability of the institution. However, the main weakness 
of the reform package lies on the informal setback of the European Minister, modelled on the 
Eurogroup. If the Commission succeed into supporting the proposal in front of the Council, this might 
lead, overall, to a weak reform that might raise issues in terms of judicial review and lack of 
competences of the decision taken. 
 
7. The need for a comprehensive reform of the EMU? 
 
The analysis carried on the EMU reform package and on the governance of the economic and 
monetary Union unveils, albeit taking also into account the many good inputs that this reform 
provides, the limits and the perils of the reform package proposed by the Commission. When times 
are hard, however, pragmatism has often proved to be, in the history of EU integration, the best 
solution, and we have no doubt that the EU institutions will do “whatever it takes” (© Mario Draghi) 
to save the euro and the EMU. Problem is, at this point of EU integration, that the crisis rhetoric that 
has imbibed the narrative over EMU reform is in place since almost 10 years: when the exception 
becomes the rule, then it means that the other options are short-handed. That is why the current 
initiative of the Commission is problematic, since it aims, with the instruments available within the 
EU legal framework, to consolidate the solutions proposed to counter the economic crisis in a way 
that is not compatible with the competences established by the Lisbon Treaty. The task of the 
Commission, the one in power or the one kicking off mandate in 2019, will become Sisyphean, 
without a serious reflection over the reform of the Treaties. However, it is evident that the current 
legal and political framework (e. g. Brexit, asylum and migration crisis, the formation of at least two 
groups of Member States which are not favourable to further integration), is not leaving room for 
future constitutional reforms. An interesting proposal has however been brought forward by the 
attempt launched in politics and scholarship to discuss the democratisation of the EU economic 
governance.5 As naïve as might appear the attempt, the T-Dem initiative has the potential to nourish 
and foster the debate over the reform of the Treaties, involving a discussion over their amendment. 
The side effect of this proposal is that, in a similar fashion to the informal setback of the role of the 
European Minister, but contrary to the overall spirit of reconstitutionalisation of the proposal, it is 
built on intergovernamentalism (Platon, 2017). The price to be paid for initiatives alike the T-Dem, 
on the side of the Commission, might be too high. The risk is that the Commission task of bringing 
democratic accountability in the EMU will prove to be unsuccessful, and the intergovernmentalism 
problems of legitimacy and lack of competences will continue to pop up in the debate over reform. 
In any event, day will come when a structural reform of economic governance will need to be pursued. 
Perhaps, a serious discussion over its opportunity and a “constitutional momentum” are needed more 
now than ever. 
 
8. Conclusion  
                                                 
5 See the Treaty on the Democratisation of the Euro-Area (T-Dem). Available at http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/T-
DEM%20-%20Final%20english%20version%209march2017.pdf 
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The picture of the reform brought to bring the EMU back into the constitutional framework of the 
Treaties is ongoing. The Commission, after presenting a Communication on the 2021-2027 
Multiannual Financial Framework at the beginning of May 2018 (COM(2018) 321), and another on 
sovereign bond-backed securities (COM(2018) 339), presented at the end of May 2018 two proposals, 
on the Reform Support Programme (COM(2018) 391) and on the establishment of a European 
Investment Stabilisation Function (COM(2018) 387). Despite the activism of the Commission, much 
still remains to be discussed: the informal setback of the European Minister of Economy and Finance, 
the broad discretion left to the Member States in the TSCG proposal, the powers of buying bonds and 
the mechanism of approval of the Council in the EMF proposal and the choice the legal basis are only 
a few of the problems that are in need of a solution. Even if the proposals are able to find the majority 
necessary for their approval in the Council, it is likely that the proposed directives and regulations 
will be reviewed by national supreme and constitutional Courts for their compliance, inter alia, with 
the principle of conferred powers (Payandeh 2017, 400; Baroncelli 2017, 79). With this – extremely 
ambitious – package of initiatives, the Commission is appears to offer to the EU and national policy-
makers an utopist vision of the future of the EMU (Körner, 2017). How about this apparent utopism 
concealing a pragmatic vision? Since time before the end of the EU legislature is short, the 
Commission has launched the initiative on the EMU reform in order to make the Parliament and (in 
particular) the Council pay the price of their political inactivity. Similarly to what happened with the 
initiative (COM(2013) 71) on the Financial Transaction Tax,6 the Commission unveils an ambitious 
package of initiatives in order to challenge to the Council and – ultimately – the Member States. It 
will be for the Member States to decide how to cope with it, but at least the price of the inaction will 
not bear on the shoulders of the Commission. This challenge seems to have the ultimate purpose of 
increasing the political accountability of the system and to equip, within the framework of the 
Treaties, the EU institutions and bodies with a clearer framework of competences on economic 
policies, thus remedying, albeit only partially, to the asymmetry of the economic and the monetary 
policies. As it has been outlined above, however, in lack of a structured discussion over the 
opportunity to reform the Treaties, the task of the Commission to bring the EMU back into the EU 
constitutional framework will become impossible. It is however the reality of the political situation 
that eventually dictates rules to executives, and it is likely that the Commission will be required to 
cope and work within the current Treaties legal framework for some more years, perhaps exploring 
the possibility of an enhanced cooperation procedure. This reform package is far from being a 
sufficient compromise, but if it manages to bring attention about its structural reform on the agenda 
of EU and national policy-makers it will have reported at least a small victory.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 See the reference in the EUI State of the Union address of 10 May 2018 by the President of the European Commission, 
Jean Claude Juncker: [available only in French] “Nous avons proposé une taxe sur les transactions financières – ce n'est 
pas la faute de la Commission que le Conseil tarde à se mettre d'accord, Monsieur le Président de la région; là encore, 
ce n'est pas la Commission, c'est les Etats membre qui avancent d'un pas hésitant vers plus de justice fiscale. Nous venons 
de proposer une meilleure imposition des géants du net, proposition jusqu'à ce jour non encore acceptée, même seulement 
partiellement examinée par le Conseil”.  
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